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BANKRUPTCY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW UNDER
THE NEW CODE BEGINS
DAVID S. KURTZ*
On November 6, 1978, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,' usu-
ally referred to as the Bankruptcy Code, was signed into law, supersed-
ing the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The new law took effect on October 1,
1979, and governs all bankruptcy cases filed after that date.
The Seventh Circuit decided several cases during its 1981-1982
term which involve issues of substantive bankruptcy law. Appeals aris-
ing from bankruptcy cases filed prior to October 1, 1979 presented is-
sues under the Bankruptcy Act, while appeals involving cases filed
subsequent to October 1, 1979 were decided by the Seventh Circuit
under the Bankruptcy Code. This article will survey four Seventh Cir-
cuit opinions, all decided under the Bankruptcy Code, which have sig-
nificant impact upon the development of bankruptcy law. For the
purposes of this article, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 shall be
referred to as the Bankruptcy Code, and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as
the Bankruptcy Act.
INVOLUNTARY CASES-IN RE COVEY
One of the significant changes effectuated by the Bankruptcy Code
is the treatment of involuntary cases.2 The Bankruptcy Code has made
it easier for creditors to force an individual or corporation into bank-
ruptcy. "Acts of bankruptcy" have been eliminated from the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 3 The debtor's balance sheet insolvency4 is also no longer
a relevant factor in the adjudication of an involuntary petition. Basi-
cally, petitioning creditors need only establish that the debtor is gener-
* B.A., Case Western Reserve University, 1976; J.D., Case Western Reserve University,
1979. Mr. Kurtz is associated with the law firm of Nachman, Munitz & Sweig, Ltd., Chicago,
Illinois.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
2. For an excellent discussion of the contrast between involuntary bankruptcy under the
Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Code, see H. MILLER AND M. COOK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT, 62-89 (1981).
3. Section 3 of the Bankruptcy Act required an act of bankruptcy as a condition to involun-
tary relief. Petitioning creditors were required to prove that within four months prior to the filing
of a petition, the debtor committed one of the six acts of bankruptcy set forth in section 3(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act. See I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 3.03, at 403-44 (14th ed. 1974).
4. Under sections 3(b), (c) and (d) of the Bankruptcy Act, the debtor could assert its sol-
vency as a defense to an involuntary petition.
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ally not paying its debts, or that within 120 days before the date of the
filing of the petition, a custodian, receiver or agent was appointed or
took possession of the debtor's property.5
Three or more entities whose claims against the debtor are not
contingent as to liability must join in an involuntary bankruptcy peti-
tion 6 unless the debtor has fewer than twelve unsecured creditors, in
which case the requisite number is reduced to one.7 The Bankruptcy
Code further requires8 that petitioning creditors must have claims to-
talling in the aggregate at least $5,000 more than the value of any lien
on property of the debtor securing such claims.9 Additional rules per-
tain to the commencement of involuntary cases against partnerships.' 0
Since in the context of an involuntary bankruptcy case there is
often little debate that the debtor is generally not paying its debts as
they become due, the debtor against whom an involuntary bankruptcy
petition has been commenced and who wishes to avoid bankruptcy is
left to attack the qualifications of the petitioning creditors to initiate the
involuntary case. In In re Covey,"I the Seventh Circuit was confronted
with several such challenges in considering (1) whether creditors hold-
ing claims that are disputed by a bankruptcy debtor may, under section
303(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 12 use such claims as the basis for an
involuntary bankruptcy petition, and (2) whether disputed claims
should, under section 303(h)(1),' 3 be considered in determining
whether the debtor is generally paying its debts as they become due.' 4
5. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (Supp. V 1981).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
8. Similar requirements under the Bankruptcy Act are set forth in section 59(b).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(I) (Supp. V 1981).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
11. 650 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1981).
12. Section 303(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
An involuntary case is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition
under chapter 7 or II of this title- by three or more entities, each of which is either a
holder of a claim against such person that is not contingent as to liability or an indenture
trustee representing such a holder, if such claims aggregate at least $5,000 more than the
value of any lien on property of the debtor securing such claims held by the holders of
such claims ...
13. Section 303(h)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
If the petition is not timely controverted, the court shall order relief against the debtor in
an involuntary case under the chapter under which the petition was filed. Otherwise,
after trial, the court shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case under the
chapter under which the petition was filed, only if-
(1) the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become
due ....
14. The court in Covey also determined that the decision of a bankruptcy court whether to
abstain from a properly filed bankruptcy petition is not reviewable. 650 F.2d at 878. Since the
court's holding on this issue is clearly mandated by the literal language of section 305(c) of the
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Royal and Norma Covey held a Dodge dealership which they op-
erated as a partnership under the name "Covey Dodge" until Novem-
ber 7, 1979. Two months thereafter, Chrysler Credit Corporation
commenced an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the Coveys in
the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois. Three months
after the involuntary case was commenced, the Coveys filed a lawsuit
against Chrysler Credit Corporation in the United States District Court
alleging breach of contract and antitrust violations. Thereafter
Chrysler Motors (as distinguished from Chrysler Credit Corporation),
and Anderson Dodge, from whom the Coveys leased the automobile
dealership property, intervened as petitioning creditors in the bank-
ruptcy case.' 5 All but $500 of the claims of the three petitioning credi-
tors were disputed by the Coveys.
The Coveys argued before the bankruptcy court that the involun-
tary petition should be dismissed because the claims of the petitioning
creditors were disputed. The Coveys further argued that notwithstand-
ing the above, the involuntary petition should be dismissed because
they were under no obligation to pay disputed debts. The bankruptcy
court found in favor of the petitioning creditors on both issues and en-
tered an order for relief against the Coveys.' 6 The decision of the
bankruptcy court was affirmed by the district court in an unpublished
opinion. ' 7
In an opinion written by Judge Sprecher, the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the decision of the bankruptcy and district courts. Acknowledg-
ing that the claim of Chrysler Credit Corporation was disputed in full,
the Seventh Circuit nevertheless held that Chrysler Credit Corporation
Bankruptcy Code, this aspect of the Covey decision will not be discussed in this article. Section
305 of the Bankruptcy Code provides in pertinent part:
Abstension
(a) The court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this title, or may
suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any time if-
(1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismis-
sal or suspension;
(c) An order under subsection (a) of this section dismissing a case or suspending all
proceedings in a case, or a decision not so to dismiss or suspend, is not reviewable by
appeal or otherwise.
15. Under section 303(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, a creditor may join an involuntary petition
with the same effect as if such creditor were an original petitioning creditor.
16. An adjudication against the alleged debtor on an involuntary petition is an "order for
relief" under 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (Supp. V 1981).
17. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1408 (Supp. IV 1980), appeals from bankruptcy court decisions
are taken to the district court of the judicial district in which the bankruptcy court is located,
unless the circuit council of a circuit orders under 28 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. IV 1980) that a panel of
three bankruptcy judges be designated to hear such appeals. The Seventh Circuit does not utilize
the appellate panel of bankruptcy judges. Appeals from orders of the district court reviewing
bankruptcy court decisions are taken to the court of appeals.
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was not disqualified from initiating a. bankruptcy case against the
Coveys.' 8 The court looked to the language of section 101(4)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code which defines "claim" as any "right to payment"
whether "disputed" or "undisputed."1 9 Since section 303(b)(1) "gives
the right to be a petitioning creditor to any holder of a claim except the
holder of a claim contingent as to liability, ' 20 the dispute regarding
Chrysler Credit Corporation's claim was immaterial under section
101(4)(A) to the standing of Chrysler Credit Corporation to be a peti-
tioning creditor. The Seventh Circuit expressly observed that its hold-
ing on this issue related only to the ability of creditors holding disputed
claims to initiate an involuntary case, and had no bearing upon
whether the claims of the petitioning creditors would ultimately be al-
lowed in the ensuing bankruptcy case.2' The same analysis was ap-
plied by the court to the claims of Chrysler Motors and Anderson
Dodge.22
The Seventh Circuit next considered whether disputed debts must
be excluded from the bankruptcy court's calculation of whether the
debtors were generally paying their debts as such debts became due.23
The court considered this issue "a thorny one." On one hand the court
noted, debtors should not, to avoid an involuntary petition in bank-
ruptcy, be forced to pay disputed debts. However, the court recognized
that "an important goal of the new Bankruptcy Code is to ensure
prompt resolution of the question of whether a debtor is generally pay-
ing its debts in an initial proceeding, reserving the litigation of specific
disputes and defenses for subsequent proceedings. '24
As a method of resolving these conficting policy considerations,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that "there cannot be any absolute rule
that disputed debts either should or should not be considered, ' 25 and
formulated instead a structured balancing test to be used in making the
determination.26 The test is outlined as follows:
1. First, the bankruptcy courts must examine the nature of the dis-
pute and determine if the dispute concerns the threshold ques-
tion of whether any claim exists, or merely involves the amount
of the claim. If the dispute is only as to the amount, the analysis




22. Id at 882.
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id at 883.
26. Id
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ends here, for the Seventh Circuit notes that there is no reason
why claims disputed only as to amount should be excluded in
determining whether the debtor is generally paying its debts as
they become due.
2. Second, if the debt is disputed in full, the bankruptcy court must
consider the complexity of the litigation required to resolve the
dispute. If resolution of the dispute will require substantial liti-
gation or if the substantial litigation question itself will require
substantial litigation, the litigation should occur later in the case,
and the disputed debt should be counted in determining whether
the debtor is generally paying its debts as they become due.
3. Third, if resolution of the dispute will not require substantial liti-
gation, bankruptcy courts must balance creditors' interests
against those of the debtor. If the balance favors the debtor's
interests in avoiding the involuntary bankruptcy, then the court
should consider the dispute, and if the debtor prevails, the dis-
puted debt should be excluded. If the interests of the petitioning
creditors favor the prompt determination of the involuntary peti-
tion, the merits of the dispute should not be considered, and the
disputed debts should be considered. Where the scales are
equally balanced, the disputed debts should be considered in de-
termining whether the debtor is generally paying its debts as they
become due.
Applying the test to the facts before it, the Seventh Circuit deter-
mined that the claims of Chrysler Motors and Anderson Dodge would
require substantial litigation and, accordingly, should without further
analysis be considered in determining whether the Coveys were gener-
ally paying their debts as they became due.27 However, as an aside, the
court noted that even if balanced, the interests of the petitioning credi-
tors versus the interests of the Coveys did not favor the Coveys. Since
the Coveys had closed their automobile dealership, "[tihere was no
ongoing business to be harmed by the stigma of an involuntary bank-
ruptcy."' 28 Further, the fact that the Coveys were disputing 99-1/2% of
their debts represented to the court that the Coveys' disputes were
merely "strategic gamesmanship." 29  Since neither the claim of
Chrysler Motors nor Anderson Dodge was being paid, the involuntary
petition could stand on this basis alone.30
27. The court also concluded that the claim of Chrysler Credit Corporation would not re-
quire substantial litigation. However, since the involuntary petition could be sustained on the
basis of the non-payment of the claims of Chrysler Motors and Anderson Dodge, it was not neces-
sary for the court to resort to the "balancing test" as to the claim of Chrysler Credit Corporation.
650 F.2d at 883.
28. Id at 884.
29. Id
30. For interesting examples of the application of the Covey test by two bankruptcy courts,
see Matter of B. D. Intern. Discount Corp., 15 B.R. 755 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); and In re North
County Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 13 B.R. 393 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
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The Covey decision raises several interesting questions. The
Coveys could have argued that the disputed claims of the petitioning
creditors were contingent 3' upon a court ultimately declaring their va-
lidity, and therefore ineligible under section 303(b)(1) to serve as the
basis for an involuntary petition. Under this construction of the word,
all disputed claims would be "contingent." The Seventh Circuit
touched upon this issue in a footnote in which it quoted from the deci-
sion of the bankruptcy court in In re All Media Properties, Inc. ,32 where
the court observed:
Furthermore, § 303 indicates that there is a difference between a dis-
puted claim, an unmatured claim, an unliquidated claim and a con-
tingent claim. Otherwise, there would be no necessity to include the
word contingent. Stated another way, just because a claim is unliqui-
dated, disputed or unmatured apparently does not mean it is
contingent. 33
By way of a footnote, the Covey decision suggests that in the Sev-
enth Circuit, disputed claims will not necessarily be considered contin-
gent for the purposes of section 303(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.34
Since Covey did not directly confront the issue, however, future deci-
sions on this point are a virtual certainty.
Another interesting aspect of the Covey decision involves the fact
that no mention is made of whether the Coveys were, as of the com-
mencement of the involuntary petition, paying their obligations to their
other creditors who did not join in the involuntary petition. 35 This is a
significant omission because section 303(h) of the Bankruptcy Code im-
poses no requirement that an involuntary petition be commenced by a
creditor whose debt is not being paid, but merely states that the court
31. A well accepted definition of a contingent claim is one which the debtor will be called
upon to pay only upon the occurrence or happening of an extrinsic event which establishes the
liability of the debtor to the alleged creditor. In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980). For example, the liability of a guarantor of a promissory note is contin-
gent upon the default of the primary obligator.
32. Id at 132.
33. Id at 133.
34. A comment recently made in Bittner v. Borne Chemical Co., Inc., 691 F.2d 134 (3rd Cir.
1982), indicates that the Third Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion. There, in the context
of a dispute concerning the interpretation of section 502(c)(I) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court
noted:
The Rolfite stockholders assert that the claims are not contingent since they are not de-
pendent on some future event which may never occur. Inasmuch as the very existence of
the claims in the reorganization proceeding is dependent on a favorable decision by the
state court, the Rolfite stockholders are clearly mistaken.
691 F.2d at 137 n.5. The Borne decision suggests that all disputed claims are contingent. Its
impact, if any, on the law relating to involuntary bankruptcy petitions remains to be seen.




shall order relief if "the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's
debts as such debts become due." Presumably an order for relief could
have been entered against the Coveys without regard to whether the
debts of the petitioning creditors were being paid. This issue, however,
was not considered by the Seventh Circuit.
Third, in analyzing whether disputed debts should be considered
in determining if a debtor is generally paying its debts as they become
due, the Seventh Circuit eschewed the solution suggested by the literal
language of the Bankruptcy Code. The Seventh Circuit commented
that "the Code is silent as to the calculation of disputed debts ... .,"36
but failed to note that "debt" is defined in section 101(11) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code as "liability on a claim." The legislative history indicates
that "the terms [debt and claim] are co-extensive; a creditor has a
'claim' against debtor; the debtor owes a 'debt' to the creditor. ' 37 As
noted by the Seventh Circuit itself, the definition of "claim" includes
even disputed claims.38 Likewise then, it would seem to follow that
"debts" under the literal language of section 303(h) of the Bankruptcy
Code should, technically and definitionally, include disputed debts.
On this basis it would seem that without resort to the balancing test,
disputed debts should be considered in determining whether a debtor is
generally paying its debts as they become due.
Does the Covey decision offer creditors an opportunity to use an
involuntary bankruptcy petition as leverage to obtain payment on
claims which are the subject of bona fide disputes? Probably not, be-
cause section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code provides safeguards against
the use of an involuntary bankruptcy petition in that fashion. Further-
more, once initiated, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy is difficult
to undo. Section 3030) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that an invol-
untary petition can only be dismissed after notice to all creditors of the
debtor, and a hearing, and provides non-petitioning creditors an oppor-
tunity to examine the circumstances of the proposed dismissal. Prefer-
ential payments contemplated in consideration for the agreement of the
petitioning creditors to consent to a dismissal may be undone by the
court. Further, section 303(i) of the Bankruptcy Code allows the bank-
ruptcy court to impose costs and attorneys' fees against a petitioning
creditor if the bankruptcy court dismisses an involuntary petition other
than on consent of all petitioners and the debtor, and even compensa-
36. 650 F.2d at 883.
37. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (1977).
38. 650 F.2d at 882.
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tory and punitive damages if the petition is determined to have been
filed in bad faith.
In all, Covey was correctly decided. If adopted by the Seventh
Circuit, the Coveys' arguments would have allowed "a debtor to evade
an involuntary bankruptcy solely by raising a red flag of dispute." 39
Covey's impact, if any, on the practices of creditors relating to involun-
tary bankruptcy petitions remains, of course, to be seen.
Chapter 13 - In re Rimgale
One of the most sweeping changes affected by the Bankruptcy
Code is the treatment of cases filed under chapter 13. No longer must
debtors solicit and obtain creditor acceptance of their chapter 13 plans
by majority vote;4° plans are automatically confirmed upon the satis-
faction of certain standards which are set forth in section 1325 of the
Bankruptcy Code.41 Eligibility requirements for chapter 13 relief have
been greatly enlarged.42 The effect of a discharge obtained under chap-
ter 13, which is set forth in section 1328 of the Bankruptcy Code, has
39. Id at 884.
40. Under section 651 of the Bankruptcy Act, a chapter XIII plan could not be confirmed
unless it had been accepted by a majority of all unsecured creditors whose claims had been proved
and allowed before the conclusion of the first meeting of creditors.
41. Section 1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
The court shall confirm a plan if-
(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with other applicable
provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or by the
plan, to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by
law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the
amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated
under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B) (i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien secur-
ing such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distrib-
uted under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed
amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder;
and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply
with the plan.
42. Under section 109(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, individuals with regular income, excluding
stockbrokers and commodity brokers, are eligible for chapter 13 relief. This includes "wage earn-
ers," the only individuals eligible for relief under section 606(8) of chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy
Act, as well as, for example, self-employed individuals, proprietors of unincorporated businesses,
and professional persons. For a more detailed discussion of the expanded eligibility requirements
under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, see Lee, Chapter 13 nee Chapter XIII., 53 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 303 (1979).
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been made extremely broad in scope. Congress has created a chapter
13 which is substantially different in operation from chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act.
Section 1328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code43 excepts only two classes
of obligations from the discharge provisions of chapter 13: long term
secured or unsecured debts on which the last payment is due after the
date on which the final payment under the plan is due, and any debt
owed to a spouse, former spouse or child for alimony, maintenance or
support. Section 1328(a) allows chapter 13 debtors to discharge debts
that would be non-dischargeable in a chapter 744 case pursuant to sec-
tion 523 of the Bankruptcy Code; including, for example, debts for ob-
taining money, property or services by fraud or false pretense.45 What
is not clear is whether the dischargeability of a debt under chapter 7
plays a role in determining if the standards for confirmation of a chap-
ter 13 plan (set forth in section 1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Code) have
been met. Some courts have answered this question unequivocally in
the negative. 46 Others, however, have held that the non-dischargeabili-
ty of certain debts in a hypothetical chapter 7 case, pursuant to section
523 of the Bankruptcy Code, is relevant in determining whether in a
chapter 13 case, the "good faith" requirement of section 1325(a)(3) of
the Bankruptcy Code has been satisfied.47 Another court has held that
the dischargeability of certain claims under chapter 7 impacts upon
whether holders of such claims shall, under the proposed chapter 13
plan, receive on account thereof property equal in value to the amount
that would be paid on such claims if the case were administered under
chapter 7, as required by section 1325(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. 48
These issues were considered by the Seventh Circuit in In re Rim-
43. Section 1328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the
plan, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor after
the order for relief under this chapter, the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all
debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title, except any
debt-
(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) of this title; or
(2) of the kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title.
44. The scope of a discharge obtained by an individual debtor under chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code is set forth in section 727(b).
45. See section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code for a complete enumeration of those debts
exempted from a chapter 7 discharge.
46. See, e.g., In re Blossfeld, 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 44 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); In re Slade,
8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 558 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981); In re Graff, 7 B.R. 426 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
47. See, e.g., In re Murallo, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 478 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980); In re W.
Michael Johnson, 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 856 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1981).
48. See In re McMinn, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 297 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
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gale 9 Prior to the commencement of their joint chapter 13 case, 50 the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, entered a judgment against the
Rimgales in a lawsuit filed against them by Mary Ravenot. Ms. Rave-
not alleged in the lawsuit that Mrs. Rimgale, a psychiatric nurse, had,
at a time when Ms. Ravenot was a patient undergoing psychiatric treat-
ment at the hospital in which Mrs. Rimgale was employed, induced her
to give the Rimgales the proceeds of her husband's life insurance poli-
cies. The Circuit Court of Cook County awarded Ms. Ravenot com-
pensatory damages of $29,743, and $3,988 in prejudgment interest
against the Rimgales jointly. The circuit court also awarded Ms. Rave-
not punitive damages of $5,000 and attorneys' fees and costs against
Donald Rimgale alone, and imposed a constructive trust in Ms. Rave-
not's favor on certain real and personal property acquired by the Rim-
gales with the insurance money, including the Rimgales' personal
residence.
The first and first amended5 ' chapter 13 plans filed by the Rim-
gales scheduled Ms. Ravenot's claim as a fully unsecured joint obliga-
tion of the Rimgales in the amount of the compensatory damages and
attorneys' fees awarded by the Circuit Court of Cook County, making
no reference to the punitive damages awarded. Further, even though
the circuit court judgment had become final, Ms. Ravenot's claim was
scheduled by the Rimgales as "disputed." Neither plan proposed any
payments to Ms. Ravenot, although other unsecured creditors were to
receive, over a period of thirty-six months, 45% of their claims under
the first plan, and 33% thereof under the first amended plan.
The second amended plan filed by the Rimgales, which was ulti-
mately confirmed by the bankruptcy court over Ms. Ravenot's objec-
tion, treated the debt owed to Ms. Ravenot as secured to the extent of
$25,000, representing an estimate of what Ms. Ravenot would receive
through the sale of the Rimgales' house, and an unsecured claim of
$24,799.54, of which 11% was to be paid over a period of forty-two
months.
On appeal, the district court overturned the order of confirmation,
reasoning that the non-dischargeability of Ms. Ravenot's claim under
chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code meant that Ms. Ravenot was not
receiving under the Rimgales' chapter 13 plan at least as much as she
49. 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982).
50. Section 302(a) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the commencement of a joint case by the
filing of a single petition by an individual and such individual's spouse.
5 1. Section 1323(a) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the debtor to modify a proposed chapter
13 plan at any time before confirmation.
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would have received on her claim in a chapter 7 liquidation, as re-
quired under section 1325(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. This being
dispositive, the district court did not reach Ms. Ravenot's assertions
that the Rimgales' plan had not been filed in "good faith" as required
by section 1325(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, and that "the bank-
ruptcy judge had unduly restricted her arguments against the plan
"52
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the order of the district
court, hopefully laying to rest permanently the argument that the value
of a claim that would be non-dischargeable in a hypothetical case
under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is a factor to be taken into
account in determining whether the requirements of section 1325(a)(4)
have been satisfied.53 The Seventh Circuit correctly observed that
"what is to be compared is the total of the payments to the creditor,
discounted to present value, and the amount the creditor would receive
in a straight liquidation. ' 54 This does not, noted the Seventh Circuit,
include additional sums that a creditor holding a claim non-discharge-
able under section 523 might receive from a chapter 7 debtor after
liquidation from funds outside of the bankruptcy estate. 55 To have
held otherwise would have effectively rendered meaningless the gener-
ous discharge provisions contained in chapter 13.
However, the Seventh Circuit was not prepared to hold that the
non-dischargeability of a particular debt under section 523 is of no mo-
ment in determining whether a chapter 13 plan was proposed in "good
faith" as required under section 1325(a)(3). The court noted that the
duty of the bankruptcy court to evaluate whether the chapter 13 plan
was filed in "good faith" precludes a "routine" application of the "good
faith" test, and would allow and possibly require the bankruptcy judge
to take into consideration many matters, including possibly the dis-
chargeability in a hypothetical chapter 7 case of a debtor's debts.56 Ex-
actly what in the final analysis shall constitute "good faith" must,
stated the Seventh Circuit, be defined on a case-by-case basis as courts
encounter varied problems in the administration of chapter 13 cases. 57
As a guide, the Seventh Circuit offered several factors5 8 to be consid-
ered in determining if the "good faith" standard has been satisfied, and




56. 669 F.2d at 431-32.
57. Id
58. Id at 432.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for a consideration of those
factors. The factors were:
1. Are the debtor's secured and unsecured debts stated accurately?
2. Does the proposed plan state the debtor's expenses accurately?
3. Is the percentage of repayment of unsecured claims correct?
4. Are inaccuracies in the plan an attempt to mislead the bank-
ruptcy court?
5. Do the proposed payments indicate a fundamental fairness in
dealing with one's creditors? Under the facts and circumstances
of Rimgale, considerations of "fundamental fairness" can
include, 59
a) The timing of the bankruptcy filings.
b) The portion of the unsecured debt represented by the
Ravenot claim.
c) The equities of classifying together consumer debts and
a judgment debt arising out of intentionally tortious
conduct.
At the very least, it appears that Rimgale rejects those cases hold-
ing that the dischargeability of claims under chapter 7 is immaterial in
determining whether the "good faith" requirements of section
1325(a)(3) have been satisfied. By no means, however, does Rimgale
hold all chapter 13 plans proposing to discharge claims that would be
nondischargeable under chapter 7 to beper se proposed in "bad faith."
In its effort to give structure to the "good faith" analysis, the Seventh
Circuit may have created further confusion. There is little doubt that
Ms. Ravenot's claim against the Rimgales would have been held to be
non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(2) and (6) of the Bankruptcy
Code and, accordingly, its consideration as a separate factor in deter-
mining "fundamental fairness" would pose little practical difficulty for
the bankruptcy court. Rimgale offers no indication, however, of the
extent to which bankruptcy courts must give consideration to the dis-
chargeability of a claim where the issue of dischargeability is not as
clear. Unless it is limited only to its facts, Rimgale could be interpreted
to require bankruptcy courts to consider in some fashion the dis-
chargeability of a particular claim in a chapter 7 case under section 523
before applying the "fundamental fairness" component of the "good
faith" test. Taken to the extreme, Ringale could be deemed to require
the adjudication by the bankruptcy court of the dischargeability of a
claim under chapter 7 before determining "good faith." This would
give creditors control over a chapter 13 case never contemplated by the
Bankruptcy Code simply by raising the dischargeability issue at the
59. Id at 433 n.22.
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confirmation hearing. Almost certainly this was not the intention of
the Seventh Circuit. A possible approach to Rimgale more consistent
with the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code would be to require the bank-
ruptcy courts to take into consideration the possible non-dis-
chargeability of a debt under section 523 in determining "fundamental
fairness" only where aprimafacie case of non-dischargeability is ap-
parent. The development of the law on this point will be interesting.
The inclusion by the Seventh Circuit of the timing of the bank-
ruptcy filing as a factor to be considered in determining "fundamental
fairness" seems to suggest that a chapter 13 case filed for the obvious
purpose of frustrating imminent legal action by a creditor could have a
negative effect upon the ability of the debtor to obtain confirmation of
his chapter 13 plan. This is troublesome because bankruptcy cases
have historically been filed on the eve of creditor action to obtain the
immediate benefits of the automatic stay set forth in section 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code.60 Whether the timing of a bankruptcy case becomes
for the first time an important factor in determining whether a chapter
13 plan was fied in "good faith" remains to be seen.
Perhaps some insight into the manner in which the Rimgale test
will be applied by the bankruptcy courts can be gleaned from In re
Vratanina.61 The debtor in Vratanina listed unsecured debts of
$10,000, 80% of which were represented by a judgment obtained
against him in the circuit court which was assumed by the bankruptcy
court to be non-dischargeable under section 523 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Vratanina's chapter 13 plan proposed a 10% repayment of all
allowed unsecured claims over a period of 36 months. The judgment
creditor moved to revoke confirmation of the debtor's chapter 13 plan
on the basis that it was not fied in "good faith." In applying the "fun-
damental fairness" standard required by Rimgale, the bankruptcy court
looked only to the portion of the debtor's monthly income to be paid
into the chapter 13 plan, and determined it to be satisfactory.62 Absent
from the bankruptcy court's opinion was any mention of the large por-
tion of Vratanina's unsecured debt represented by the non-dischargea-
ble claim. The equities of classifying this claim with Vratanina's other
debts was also not discussed.
In effect, Rimgale was reduced by the court in Vratanina to a "best
efforts" analysis which was not the intention of the Seventh Circuit.
60. For a more thorough discussion of the automatic stay see infra notes 80-90 and accompa-
nying text.
61. 9 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 614 (Bankr. N.D. IU. 1982).
62. Id at 616.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
Future decisions interpreting Rimgale will be enlightening, and should
be closely monitored by attorneys representing chapter 13 debtors and
creditors alike.
Preferences - Barash v. Public Finance Corp.
One of the most important provisions of the Bankruptcy Code is
section 547 entitled "Preferences." Section 547(b) defines a preference
as a transfer of the debtor's property, made:
1) To or for the benefit of a creditor.
2) For or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before such transfer was made.
3) While the debtor was insolvent. 63
4) On or within ninety days before the date of the filing of the
petition.64
5) Which enables the creditor to receive more than he would have
received-
a) if the case were a liquidation case;
b) if the transfer had not been made; and
c) if the claim were allowed or disallowed to the extent permit-
ted by title 11.
Section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth six exceptions to
the above. One of the most important, which is contained in section
547(c)(2), provides that a transfer is not preferential:
To the extent that such transfer was -
(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs
of the debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms.
In Barash v. Public Finance Corp. ,65 the Seventh Circuit66 consid-
ered whether payments to an undersecured creditor during the 90 days
prior to bankruptcy should be applied against the secured or unsecured
component of such creditor's claim, and "whether installment pay-
ments voluntarily made by a debtor to an undersecured creditor in the
ordinary course of the debtor's financial affairs within the 90 days pre-
63. Under section 547(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor is presumed to have been insol-
vent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.
64. Where the creditor was an insider as defined in section 101(25), and had reasonable cause
to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of such transfer, the relevant period is increased
from 90 days to one year. See section 547(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.
65. 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
66. The case was actually a consolidated appeal involving eight bankruptcy cases in which
Barry Barash as chapter 7 trustee sought recovery of alleged preferential transfers. Id at 504.
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ceding bankruptcy, but not more than 45 days after their due date,' 67
fall within the section 547(c)(2) exception. Regular installment pay-
ments were made by the debtors to certain creditors within 90 days of
the commencement of their respective chapter 7 bankruptcy cases.
Each creditor receiving payments held security for its claim. In each
instance, the value of the creditor's collateral was less than the debt
which it secured, but in all but one case, the value of the collateral
exceeded the total payments made by the respective debtor during the
90-day period preceding bankruptcy.
Barash, as trustee, commenced actions to recover as preferences
the installment payments made to each creditor during the 90 days pre-
ceding bankruptcy. The creditors defended on two grounds. Since the
value of the collateral held by each as security for its claim was less
than the amount each was owed, under section 506(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code,68 all of the creditors held both a secured and unsecured
claim in the respective bankruptcy cases. From this the creditors ar-
gued that payments which they received should be charged against the
secured rather than unsecured portion of their claims. Since in almost
every case the value of the collateral held was greater than payments
received, the creditors argued that the fifth essential element of a pref-
erential transfer was lacking because such payments did not enable
them to receive more than they would have had the transfers not been
made and had they received payment on their claims to the extent pro-
vided by the Bankruptcy Code. Barash took the contrary position, as-
serting that payments must be charged against the unsecured portion of
the creditors' claims and that, therefore, such payments enabled the
creditors to receive a greater proportionate share of their claims than
other unsecured creditors.
The Seventh Circuit held in favor of Barash, finding that such pay-
ments must be first applied against the unsecured portion of the credi-
tors' claims.69 While the court's reasoning is somewhat difficult to
67. 658 F.2d at 505.
68. Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the
extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to
the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim
to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is
less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of
the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and
in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such
creditor's interest.
69. 658 F.2d at 508.
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follow, the result under the facts before it is correct. As set forth in
section 506(a), the claim of an undersecured creditor is bifurcated into
both a secured and unsecured claim, with the claim being "secured to
the extent of the value of such creditor's interest" in the debtor's prop-
erty. Accordingly, payments received by an undersecured creditor dur-
ing the 90 days preceding bankruptcy would not result in a reduction in
the secured component of its claim because, absent other circum-
stances, the value of the collateral is unchanged. 70 Such payments re-
sult merely in a reduction of the difference between the total amount
owed to the creditor and the value of the collateral held, which differ-
ence equals the unsecured portion of the claim. Since payments re-
ceived by necessity have the effect of reducing the unsecured portion of
the claim, the court's conclusion on this issue was correct.
The Seventh Circuit did not mention that it will not in all in-
stances be proper to apply payments against the unsecured portion of a
debt owed to an undersecured creditor. Consider the situation where
payments are made by a debtor out of the proceeds of a creditor's col-
lateral. Here, unlike above, the value of the collateral, at least theoreti-
cally, declines as payments are made to the creditor, and the secured
portion of the creditor's claim is, under section 506(a), reduced by a
like amount. It is therefore incorrect to apply payments which repre-
sent the proceeds of a creditor's collateral to the unsecured portion of
the creditor's claim and, as a result, such payments, even if made
within 90 days of bankruptcy, would not be preferential. Barash
should not be interpreted as holding that payments made to an under-
secured creditor are to be applied against the unsecured portion of a
creditor's claim under all circumstances.
The Seventh Circuit then turned its attention to the applicability
of the exception contained in section 547(c)(2), which is commonly
known as the "45 day rule." Each payment in Barash was on an in-
stallment contract made within 45 days of the date each particular in-
stallment became due. The creditors argued that section 547(c)(2)
immunizes such payments from the trustee's attack. Barash disagreed,
claiming that the payments were not made within "45 days after such
debt was incurred," because the debt was incurred at the time the un-
derlying purchase was made, and not when each installment became
due.
Called upon to decide when a debt is incurred in an installment
70. This is true only until the amount owed to the creditor is reduced below the value of the
collateral held, in which case the creditor is no longer unsecured.
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transaction for the purposes of section 547(c)(2), the Seventh Circuit
adopted the position advanced by the trustee and held that the debt is
incurred when the legal obligation to pay arises. 71 The Seventh Circuit
commented that section 547(c)(2) "is aimed at transactions which, al-
though they are technically credit transactions, are not intended to re-
main unpaid for a long time."' 72 The court did not consider the
legislative history pertaining to section 547(c)(2) indicating that the
purpose of section 547(c)(2) is to "leave undisturbed normal financial
relations" which was the context in which the subject payments were
made.73 Rather, the court concluded that the installment debts in-
volved did not fall within the statutory design, and held that the pay-
ments made by the debtors in Barash could be avoided as preferential
transfers to the extent that such payments are credited against the un-
secured component of a particular creditor's claim.74
The Seventh Circuit in Barash did not consider an interesting is-
sue raised by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Iowa Pre-
mium Service Co., Inc. 75 which is directly pertinent. There the court
observed that in many instances, a portion of a typical installment pay-
ment represents accrued interest rather than principal. While an obli-
gation to repay principal arises at the inception of the credit
transaction, an interest debt, the court notes, is not incurred until the
interest accrues 76 since "the use of money for another day is new con-
sideration each day."' 77 This being the case, the court concluded that
for the purposes of section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, the por-
tion of an installment payment representing repayment of principal
must be analyzed separately from that constituting interest, for fre-
quently interest will not have accrued more than 45 days before the
date of the payment. Barash did not address the question of accrued
interest, treating the entire amount of each installment payment as a
transfer on account of a debt incurred at the inception of the credit
transaction.
Unless it is said that a contingent obligation to pay interest, which
itself constitutes a "debt" under section 547(c)(2), arises at the time the
installment credit transaction is entered into, the well-reasoned analysis
of the Eighth Circuit has merit. If the distinction between the compo-
71. 658 F.2d at 509.
72. Id at 511.
73. H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373-74 (1977).
74. 658 F.2d at 511.
75. 695 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1982).
76. Id. at 1111.
77. Id. at 1112.
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nents of an installment payment representing principal and interest is
given general recognition by the courts, the analysis required to deter-
mine if a particular payment falls within the section 547(c)(2) exception
will be painstaking. Since interest accrues on a per diem basis, it will
be necessary to relate the date on which each payment is made to the
daily interest accrual to determine what portion of the interest paid
accrued more than 45 days before the payment date. Future case law
on this point will be interesting to monitor.
Automatic Stay-In re Holtkamp
Fundamental to bankruptcy law is the concept of the automatic
stay. The provisions of the automatic stay, which are set forth in sec-
tion 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 78 are designed to prevent the de-
pletion of the debtor's estate through the random action of creditors in
favor of an orderly liquidation and distribution under chapter 7 or a
court supervised reorganization under chapters 11 and 13.79  Under
section 362(a), all lawsuits and actions to enforce liens and collect upon
or recover claims against a bankruptcy debtor, with certain limited ex-
ceptions enumerated in section 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, are
stayed immediately upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case.
Section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the modifi-
cation or termination of the automatic stay, "for cause, including the
78. In pertinent part, section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,
302, and 303 of this title operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor that was
or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this
title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of
the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judg-
ment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to
the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement
of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States
Tax Court concerning the debtor.
79. The automatic stay "gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a
repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that. drove
him into bankruptcy." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977).
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lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in
interest."' 0 In In re Holtkamp, 81 the Seventh Circuit considered an ap-
peal from an order of the bankruptcy court modifying an automatic
stay to permit a personal injury lawsuit to proceed against Holtkamp, 82
the debtor. Five days before a personal injury suit initiated by Little-
field was set for trial, Holtkamp filed a chapter 11 case which automati-
cally stayed the personal injury suit pursuant to the provisions of
section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Littlefield immediately filed a
complaint to modify the automatic stay,83 which the bankruptcy court
agreed to hear on an emergency basis with only three hours notice to
Holtkamp. After the hearing, the bankruptcy court modified the auto-
matic stay, permitting the personal injury lawsuit to proceed against
Holtkamp in the court in which it was pending, but expressly prohib-
ited Littlefield from collecting upon any judgment entered against
Holtkamp. After a jury trial, a $5,025,000 judgment was entered in
Littlefield's favor.
The Seventh Circuit quickly dismissed Holtkamp's first argument
that section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code applies only to secured
creditors, noting that section 362(d) is available to any "party in inter-
est."'8 4 The court observed that the "stay should be lifted in appropri-
ate circumstances," 5 drawing for support the following excerpt from
the legislative history of section 362:
"It will often be more appropriate to permit proceedings to continue
in their place of origin, when no great prejudice to the bankruptcy
estate would result, in order to leave the parties to their chosen forum
and to relieve the bankruptcy court from many duties that may be
handled elsewhere. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1978)."
80. Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant
relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating,
annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property
of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property, if-
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
81. 669 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982).
82. Holikamp involved joint appeals taken by both Charles Holtkamp individually and
Holtkamp Farms, Inc., as related chapter I I debtors. For ease of reference, Holtkamp individu-
ally and Holtkamp Farms, Inc. shall be collectively referred to in this discussion as "Holtkamp."
83. A request by a party in interest to modify the automatic stay must be brought before the
court by way of an adversary proceeding initiated by complaint. See In re UNR Industries, Inc.,
23 B.R. 144 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982); Rule 701 of the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure, I I U.S.C.
(Supp. V 1981).
84. 669 F.2d at 508.
85. Id
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The Seventh Circuit concluded that the decision of the bankruptcy
court to modify the automatic stay was not an abuse of its discretion. 86
The court rejected Holtkamp's assertion that the modification of the
automatic stay was improper because it "enabled Littlefield to gain a
superior position over other creditors .... "87 By expressly prohibit-
ing Littlefield from enforcing his judgment, the bankruptcy court's or-
der effectively allowed Littlefield only to determine the amount of his
claim outside the bankruptcy court. Allowing the personal injury law-
suit to go forward on this basis alone did not, noted the Seventh Cir-
cuit, "jeopardize Holtkamp's bankrupt estate because his insurance
company assumed full financial responsibility for defending that
litigation." 88
Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected Holtkamp's claims that
proper notice of the emergency hearing had not been given, that the
bankruptcy court erred in allowing Littlefield to present evidence and
take testimony at the hearing, and that the emergency hearing was de-
fective because the bankruptcy judge failed to state specific findings of
fact and conclusions of law. 89 The Seventh Circuit noted that the
emergency hearing was a necessity since the chapter 11 case had been
filed on the eve of the trial of the personal injury lawsuit, and was en-
tirely consistent with rules 712(a) and 906(c) of the Bankruptcy Rules,
which authorize the bankruptcy judge to shorten any specified time pe-
riod, and Rule 4001(b) of the Interim Bankruptcy Rules, which permits
the bankruptcy court to grant relief from the automatic stay on an ex
parte basis.90 The court further determined that the manner in which
the emergency hearing was conducted by the bankruptcy court and the
absence of specific findings and conclusions were not improper under
the circumstances.9'
It is rare that a bankruptcy court will modify the automatic stay
only days after the commencement of a chapter 11 case. Critical to the
court's decision in Holikamp was the existence of insurance coverage
and the responsibility of the insurance carrier to represent Holtkamp in
the personal injury lawsuit. As the Seventh Circuit observed, there was
little justification from the standpoint of the bankruptcy estate for con-
86. Id at 509.
87. Id at 508.
88. Id at 508-09.
89. Id at 509.
90. Id
91. Id at 508-09.
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tinuing the automatic stay in effect under such circumstances, espe-
cially where preparations for trial had been completed.
Where insurance coverage does not include the obligation of the
carrier to defend a bankruptcy debtor, the analysis becomes more diffi-
cult, especially in a chapter 11 case. Under these circumstances the
court is required to balance the interests of the creditor in obtaining a
prompt adjudication of its claim and payment from such insurance
proceeds as may exist, against the additional costs and expenses to the
chapter 11 estate of retaining counsel to represent the debtor outside of
the bankruptcy court at a time when all of the debtor's resources are
required to sustain the operation of the debtor's business for the benefit
of all creditors. Less troublesome is the situation where no insurance
coverage is present. There, absent unusual facts,92 little justification ex-
ists for terminating the automatic stay at the outset of a chapter 1 1 case
to permit a personal injury lawsuit to proceed outside of the bank-
ruptcy court. Modifying the automatic stay under these circumstances
would be contrary to philosophical underpinnings of the automatic stay
which are intended to give the debtor a "breathing spell from his credi-
tors while the debtor" attempts a repayment or reorganization plan. 93
All things considered, Holtkamp, at least as it pertains to the modifica-
tion of the automatic stay on an emergency basis, will probably have
limited application outside of cases involving facts virtually identical to
those before the court.
CONCLUSION
With few exceptions, the decisions of the Seventh Circuit during
the recent term add little to the advancement of bankruptcy law. As
yet, the court has not had an opportunity to confront many of the sig-
nificant issues which remain unresolved under the new Bankruptcy
Code.
92. An example of facts which might justify the modification of the automatic stay shortly
after the commencement of a bankruptcy case by an uninsured debtor is where the plaintiff in the
pending lawsuit is the major or only creditor of the debtor and the bankruptcy case is filed for the
sole purpose of frustrating the collection efforts of that creditor.
93. See supra note 78.

